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raises for Gschwandtner several suspicions about Marion’s phenomenol-
ogy of love. Marion writes, for example, that a declaration of love is like 
a declaration of war in being beyond reason and calculation, and in being 
performative and not descriptive, initiating a total commitment and aban-
donment of any hope of returning to the equilibrium of exchange. Marion 
adds that the language of love also parallels—and indeed can only be ex-
pressed by means of—the language of mystical theology, and that love is 
univocal insofar as all types of love (including divine and human love) 
function in the same way. Gschwandtner highlights the problematic, if not 
extreme, character of these aspects of Marion’s recent work, concluding 
that Marion’s love “just seems a bit too overwhelming” (p. 195).
I was reminded of a play I recently saw, called Grace and co-written 
by the philosopher and critic of religion A. C. Grayling. In this play, a 
young man has a religious awakening and decides to become a priest, to 
the bewilderment of his skeptical parents and girlfriend. He nevertheless 
persists in his decision to follow his calling and shortly after asking his 
girlfriend to marry him he is killed by religious fundamentalists. His girl-
friend, who is as unsure about the marriage proposal as she is about God, 
is devastated by the death of her partner, whom she clearly loved greatly. 
In anger she protests that love, the love (of God) that killed her partner 
and the love (of her partner) that is killing her, is just too much to bear, too 
overwhelming, too blind and too violent. Her solution: kindness. Kind-
ness is measured, thoughtful, not spiteful and not liable to abuse. I left 
the play wondering whether kindness, and not the violent torrents of love 
depicted by Zizek and Marion, is what religiously inclined philosophers 
should be advocating today. 
Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology, by J. Wentzel 
van Huyssteen. University of Edinburgh, 2004. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 2006. 347 pp. $40.00
KEVIN SHARPE, Oxford University
For this book, van Huyssteen won in 2007 the first Andrew Murray-Des-
mond Tutu Prize for the Best Christian and Theological book by a South 
African. Van Huyssteen has held the James I. McCord Chair of Theology 
and Science at Princeton Theological Seminary since 1992, and deserves 
congratulations on his interdisciplinary scholarship; it is important to con-
tribute to the interaction between theology (however conceived) and sci-
ence (whatever branch).
The book discusses human uniqueness from both theological and scientific 
points of view. “We are indeed alone [van Huyssteen concludes], formed 
by biological processes such as natural selection yet, unlike all other species 
. . . we alone appear to have attained the capacity for self-consciousness and 
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symbolic thought [—our uniqueness—], which makes complex language 
and art possible.”1
When does human uniqueness emerge? What is meant by ‘human’? Is 
the ‘human’ the uniqueness? Does the term ‘human’ encompass not only 
Homo sapiens sapiens, but also earlier Homo sapiens, Homo neander-
talensis, Homo erectus, and Homo florensis? If Van Huyssteen does not 
include non-Homo sapiens species, what essentially differentiates us from 
them, in what ways are we unique? Neanderthals had large brains and 
lived beside our Homo sapien ancestors. (But see page 322 where he ad-
mits that imago Dei may not be limited to Homo sapiens. It might, many 
would add, not even be limited to the human lineage, but appear in some 
ways in other animals.) The relationship between human uniqueness and 
the imago Dei requires clarification.
Van Huyssteen supports his argument by looking at human behavior 
in the Upper Paleolithic: it holds an all-important and intriguing key, he 
thinks, to the naturalness of the evolution of religion, to the credibility of 
the earliest forms of religious faith, and to what it means for humans to be 
spiritual.2 The cultural explosion of the Upper Paleolithic saw rapid devel-
opments in artifacts, both functional and symbolic. Indisputably the most 
powerful and compelling examples of Paleolithic symbolic imagery are 
the cave paintings (some of which date to at least 30,000 years ago). They 
are “among the earliest artifacts to exhibit symbolic awareness . . . [put-
ting] us face to face with the earliest expressions of our spiritual nature.”3 
One of their functions may have been to represent or even induce altered 
states of awareness. “[T]he rock face was like a veil suspended between 
this world and the spirit  world . . . that seethed behind it,” van Huyssteen 
writes.4 The art results from shamanic religion.
Van Huyssteen unfortunately does not—or at least his source on the 
cave art, David Lewis-Williams, does not—establish this shamanic thesis 
beyond saying that it forms a speculative hypothesis or a good story. It is 
contentious, rejected by the majority of scholars in the field (a point van 
Huyssteen does not tell his readers); persuasively hard evidence has not 
so far emerged to support it. For example, finger flutings (lines drawn 
with fingers on soft surfaces) in Rouffignac and Gargas caves are artifacts 
that, by the amount of wall and ceiling space they cover, constitute the 
dominant forms of expression in each cave; but they are probably not 
shamanic, and simpler and therefore preferable explanations suffice.5 The 
1 Ronald Cole-Turner, “Review of Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and 
Theology,” by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen. Princeton Seminary Bulletin 27.3 (2006): 263.
2 J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology: 
The Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh, 2004 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), xvii.
3Cole-Turner, “Review of Alone in the World,” 263.
4Van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel, Alone in the World, 209.
5 Kevin Sharpe and Leslie Van Gelder, “Human Uniqueness and Upper Paleolithic ‘Art’: 
An Archaeologist’s Reaction to Wentzel van Huyssteen’s Gifford Lectures,” American Journal 
of Theology and Philosophy 28.3 (September 2007): 311–345.
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symbolic tectiforms in Rouffignac and, though not fluted, the stenciled 
hands in Gargas, both of which van Huyssteen points to as supporting his 
thesis, also succumb to this conclusion.
That van Huyssteen senses the correctness of the shamanic idea may 
reflect his predisposition, not the reality of the cave ‘art.’ In fact, van Huys-
steen pursues a circular argument, wanting to find religion in Paleolithic 
times and pulling heavily on writers who seem to share the same view. 
One can say that humans are possibly unique. And that notational activ-
ity, perhaps even symbolic activity, probably did exist in the European 
Paleolithic. But one has to be careful not to overindulge in romanticizing 
possible evidence for religion.
Van Huyssteen continues his argument and writes that the imago Dei 
“is found not in some narrow intellectual or spiritual capacity but in the 
whole human being, ‘body and soul.’ In fact, the image of God is not found 
in humans, but the image is the human.”6 The human features that consti-
tute the imago Dei emerge from biology.7 “Our evolutionarily developed 
bodies” constitute “the background and bearers of human uniqueness.”8
He then argues for not only the naturalness of religion, but also the 
necessity, meaningfulness, and even rationality [‘plausibility’9] of reli-
gious belief. He even tries to establish the cognitive autonomy of religion: 
its evolved character, he concludes, lends support to the hypothesis that 
it and its characteristics must be adapted and therefore have their own 
truth. But many paleoanthropologists would argue that the cognitive re-
ligious functions comprise only side effects of other, more general human 
characteristics, possibly cognitive, that nature selected for other purposes. 
The religious functions are not themselves adapted. One could ask, for in-
stance, whether God specifically created the spiritual-moral propensity or 
whether it emerged because “of the relatively large brains our species ac-
quired through evolutionary history” (p. 214). “God used natural history 
for religion,” answers van Huyssteen flying his true colors, to make reli-
gious belief emerge “as a natural phenomenon” (p. 218). In other words, 
God inserted into us at some point the seeds necessary for the emergence 
of religion. But, interjects Neil Spurway, “for the thorough-going Dar-
winian that’s a sky-hook—tantamount to mental, as against physical, 
Creationism.”10 Divine implantation assumes God’s intervention in the 
physical universe and soon hits the wall of chance; biological evolution 
requires random/chance mutations of genes, something God would not 
know about until it happened.
6 J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, “Theology, Science, and Human Nature,” Princeton Seminary 
Bulletin 27.3 (2006): 202.
7Ibid., 218.
8Ibid., 206.
9 Neil Spurway, “Review of Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology 
by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen,” ESSSAT News 16.3 (September, 2006): 17.
10Ibid., 17.
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The possibility of the rationality of religious beliefs given their role in hu-
man evolution raises the issue of their truth. Does human religious imagi-
nation relate to reality in some way? What is tested by natural selection is 
behavior, not the existence of a supernatural being.11 Religious beliefs’ ad-
vantageousness to survival—even if they were—does not imply their truth.
The imago Dei, an opponent of van Huyssteen might suggest, no mat-
ter what anyone thinks it comprises, probably builds from an anthropo-
morphic projection onto a supposed supernatural reality, then reads it off 
as applying to humans. Van Huyssteen needs to establish that there is 
an empirically describable Deus so that one can really try to discern an 
imago Dei. Otherwise nothing can distinguish circular and wishful think-
ing from the genuine truth.
The points above highlight the limits of van Huyssteen’s method. He 
wants close similarities between theology and science methodologically, 
and he wants significant differences in their ‘epistemological [foci], experi-
ential scope, and heuristic structures.’12 Though theology and science may 
overlap at the level of epistemology, he presumably intends also for sci-
ence and theology not to overlap too much on the knowledge itself. Why?
Theological reflection, in spite of important epistemological overlaps with 
scientific reflection . . . in many ways [does not resemble] . . . science at all: . . . 
faith involves not just a way of looking at the world, but also a personal trust 
in God. An ultimate faith commitment to God [resembles] . . . , in this respect, 
. . . trust in a friend or a spouse [more] than . . . belief in a scientific theory.13
Van Huyssteen thinks theology and its method derive not so much from 
the search for truth (reality viewed theologically), but from ‘the realist 
assumptions and faith commitments of experienced Christian faith.’14 He 
seeks to serve orthodox liberal beliefs and church structures, seeing theol-
ogy from the liberal tradition of emphasizing religious experience as the 
basic datum. He attempts to justify his branch of theology as it stands, 
with the assumptions it makes, as a valid way of knowing truth. His un-
derlying aim stretches around his argument to make it say what he really 
wants it to say.
However, if factual meaningfulness with respect to claims for what ac-
tually occurs makes an important requirement—and it does—van Huys-
steen’s dualistic scheme does not suffice. The similarities in method place 
requirements on the content of theology that conflict with the significant 
differences.15 The commonalities in method must generate significant 
11Ibid., 16.
12 J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, “Postfoundationalism in Theology and Science,” in Rethink-
ing Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 44.
13Ibid., 45–46.
14Ibid., 41.
15See Kevin Sharpe, Science of God: Truth in the Age of Science (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006).
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overlap in the content of the two systems of thought. Van Huyssteen’s 
method protects the two spheres and does not sufficiently stress the 
shared knowledge. It accents confirming connections rather than discon-
firming possibilities. The science should not be so interpreted that it sup-
ports a pre-accepted theology.
Does theology wish to move closer to truth or does it wish further to 
refine church doctrines once given, always to support them and never to 
remove or replace them with more truthful insights? Is its main intent 
apologetics, trying to justify its doctrines with ideas from modern science? 
Van Huyssteen attempts to save Christian theology in the face of science 
and not to be honest to the data of science. I encourage him to emerge 
further from the security of his fideist cave.
